Mev Bot is making 30 ETH every few hours!

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It is interesting to look at the code of this bot. I understand it a little bit, but I can't understand how it has time to advance its transaction to unconfirmed?
 
It is interesting to look at the code of this bot. I understand it a little bit, but I can't understand how it has time to advance its transaction to unconfirmed?
Transactions show up on the blockchain before being confirmed so the bot detects an unconfirmed transaction then makes a transaction with higher gas to be confirmed before the original transaction.
 
Yeah MEV bots are nothing new and have been around for ages.

The way it works is:

Mev bot sees a transaction on the blockchain with high slippage on a 0 tax coin.

Slippage is the amount you are willing to allow the price action to move before your transaction reverts.

0 tax coins are perfect for MEV bots as they pay no tax on their transactions to the dev they only pay the gas fee to make a transaction on Ethereum. The higher gas the higher priority your transaction is.

Using this information let’s say someone puts a $100 buy into a 0 tax coin with 10% slippage.

The MEV bot sees this transaction immediately places a buy with insanely high gas on the coin that will move the price action of the coin by 10%.

The MEV bot buy (usually multiple ETH to account for slippage) is now using more gas than the $100 buy. Now the MEV bot places a sell order directly after the $100 buy making a profit on the coin and screwing over the original buyer by ramping his price entry up by 10%.

EDIT: Jaredfromsubway has been training his MEV bot using machine learning for years. It is one of the best.
 
Yeah MEV bots are nothing new and have been around for ages.

The way it works is:

Mev bot sees a transaction on the blockchain with high slippage on a 0 tax coin.

Slippage is the amount you are willing to allow the price action to move before your transaction reverts.

0 tax coins are perfect for MEV bots as they pay no tax on their transactions to the dev they only pay the gas fee to make a transaction on Ethereum. The higher gas the higher priority your transaction is.

Using this information let’s say someone puts a $100 buy into a 0 tax coin with 10% slippage.

The MEV bot sees this transaction immediately places a buy with insanely high gas on the coin that will move the price action of the coin by 10%.

The MEV bot buy (usually multiple ETH to account for slippage) is now using more gas than the $100 buy. Now the MEV bot places a sell order directly after the $100 buy making a profit on the coin and screwing over the original buyer by ramping his price entry up by 10%.

EDIT: Jaredfromsubway has been training his MEV bot using machine learning for years. It is one of the best.
Friend, you misunderstand me, I know exactly how it works. I'm interested in how the bot manages to push its order into an unconfirmed transaction block in terms of technical programming. Perhaps the bot has its own node or validation, that's what I'm interested in.
 
Friend, you misunderstand me, I know exactly how it works. I'm interested in how the bot manages to push its order into an unconfirmed transaction block in terms of technical programming. Perhaps the bot has its own node or validation, that's what I'm interested in.
My apologies mate, I see clearly now what you were asking. Unfortunately I do not know the programming side but our friend chatGPT definitely will.
 
I found this Tweet interesting and thought to share it with the BHW crypto community :)


This MEV bot relies solely on sandwich attacks It has been profitable, with an overall net profit of $2,6M in the last 30D


Source:
There was a MEV recently that was sandwiching millions over the year, someone made a contract to trick it buy and click approve, then sucked all his liq. :D

QUOTE ON THIS
Zero pity.


The notorious MEV bot known as 0xbad has fallen on hard times, just like the rest of us.

After 75 days of exploiting value from unexpecting users, this mempool menace backfired on its owner, creating a beautiful display of on-chain karma.

After one unfortunate user tried to swap $1.85M of Compound cUSDC for USDC on Uniswap v2, a lack of liquidity meant they only received $500 in USDC. 0xbad was quick to profit from the swap, backrunning the trade with an elaborate arb involving many different DeFi dApps.

$1.02M profit.

Nice.

However…


0xbad got put down… tremendously.

An anonymous attacker noticed a flaw in the bots arbitrage contract code, and stole not only the recently acquired 800 ETH, but the entire 1,101 ETH in 0xbad’s wallet.

Attacker’s address: 0xb9f78307ded12112c1f09c16009e03ef4ef16612

0xbad: 0xbadc0defafcf6d4239bdf0b66da4d7bd36fcf05a


bertcmiller of Flashbots broke it down:

0xbad did not properly protect the function that they used to execute the dYdX flashloans.

Note "callFunction," which is the function called by the dYdX router as a part of flashloan execution



When you get a flashloan the protocol you're borrowing from will call a standardized function on your contract.

In this case dYdX called "callFunction" on 0xbad.

Unfortunately for 0xbad, their code allowed for arbitrary execution.

The attacker used this to get 0xbad to approve all of their WETH for spender on their contract.

The attacker then simply transferred the WETH out to their address.

Down 0xbad


To add further drama to the drama, 0xbad decided to try and threaten their attacker with a message sent via transaction input data.

Congratulations on this, we got careless and you sure managed to get us good, that was not easy to see. We would like this cooperate with you on resolving this matter. Return the funds to @x19603D249DF53d8b1650c762c4df316013Dce840 before September 28 at 23:59 GMT and we will consider this a whitehat, we will give you 20% of the retrieved amount as a bug bounty, payable as you see fit. Should the funds not be returned by then, we will have no choice but to pursue accordingly with everything in our power with the appropriate authorities to retrieve our funds.
Then came a reply:

What about normal people who you have mev'ed and literally fucked them? Will you return them? Return the funds to all people before September 28 at 23:59 GMT and we will consider this a whitehat, we will give you 1% of the retrieved amount as a good heart sign, payable as you see fit. Should the funds not be returned by then, we will have no choice but to pursue accordingly with everything in our power with the appropriate authorities to retrieve our funds.


Last year, in “Return to the Dark Forest”, we wrote:

Frontrunning is vampiric. It feeds off weaker participants, while conflicts with other bots push gas prices to unusable levels. Most of the time, frontrunners win…
But not this time…

MEV bots act on the boundary of “code is law”.

In the PvP arena that is Ethereum’s Dark Forest, sometimes you win and sometimes you lose.

Despite the fact that the funds were never returned to their original owner, it’s nice to see such a prompt display of on-chain karma.

As Bert Miller wrote on Twitter:

Bad code, great content

Hilarious! :D
 
There was a MEV recently that was sandwiching millions over the year, someone made a contract to trick it buy and click approve, then sucked all his liq. :D

QUOTE ON THIS
Zero pity.


The notorious MEV bot known as 0xbad has fallen on hard times, just like the rest of us.

After 75 days of exploiting value from unexpecting users, this mempool menace backfired on its owner, creating a beautiful display of on-chain karma.

After one unfortunate user tried to swap $1.85M of Compound cUSDC for USDC on Uniswap v2, a lack of liquidity meant they only received $500 in USDC. 0xbad was quick to profit from the swap, backrunning the trade with an elaborate arb involving many different DeFi dApps.

$1.02M profit.

Nice.

However…


0xbad got put down… tremendously.

An anonymous attacker noticed a flaw in the bots arbitrage contract code, and stole not only the recently acquired 800 ETH, but the entire 1,101 ETH in 0xbad’s wallet.

Attacker’s address: 0xb9f78307ded12112c1f09c16009e03ef4ef16612

0xbad: 0xbadc0defafcf6d4239bdf0b66da4d7bd36fcf05a


bertcmiller of Flashbots broke it down:

0xbad did not properly protect the function that they used to execute the dYdX flashloans.

Note "callFunction," which is the function called by the dYdX router as a part of flashloan execution



When you get a flashloan the protocol you're borrowing from will call a standardized function on your contract.

In this case dYdX called "callFunction" on 0xbad.

Unfortunately for 0xbad, their code allowed for arbitrary execution.

The attacker used this to get 0xbad to approve all of their WETH for spender on their contract.

The attacker then simply transferred the WETH out to their address.

Down 0xbad


To add further drama to the drama, 0xbad decided to try and threaten their attacker with a message sent via transaction input data.


Then came a reply:




Last year, in “Return to the Dark Forest”, we wrote:


But not this time…

MEV bots act on the boundary of “code is law”.

In the PvP arena that is Ethereum’s Dark Forest, sometimes you win and sometimes you lose.

Despite the fact that the funds were never returned to their original owner, it’s nice to see such a prompt display of on-chain karma.

As Bert Miller wrote on Twitter:

Bad code, great content

Hilarious! :D

Such a great read!

The attacker would be the "Crypto's Robinhood" if he would donate all those ETH lol
 
is this thread active ? i have develop a sandwich attack bot myself.
That screenshot doesn’t look it too pretty much real or yours..? It is a recent screenshot?
The date its killing me. If that is recent for you 2024-09-08 . I’ve glad to let you know that today it is here Nov 3.
Are you a time traveler bro!!? Skinwalker are reals i knew it! :o
 
i am not selling anything. i just created a bot and its works for me. thats all
 
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